This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are "soft" (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the accounting system as it seeks to separate investments from operating expenditures. This separation is of no concern to the stock market which draws on its own information about future cash flows resulting from current investments. The firm's stock price, however, reflects all value relevant information, parts of which are not incentive relevant. Optimal incentive provisions must combine "forward looking" market information with "backward looking" accounting information. Under certain conditions, optimal performance measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual income) and market value added.
Introduction
In order to provide incentives for their top level managers, firms rely on a range of performance indicators based on accounting data and external market information. Managerial compensation packages frequently comprise multiple ingredients including stock grants, stock options and cash bonuses based on earnings or return on assets.
1 Survey evidence indicates that there is considerable variation in the structure of managerial compensation schemes across different industries. For instance, an observation commonly made in connection with high-technology firms is that these firms tend to rely more heavily on stock based compensation in comparison to firms in more traditional industries.
2
We develop a multiperiod and multitask agency model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments in addition to exerting personally costly efforts. While investments do not impose a personal cost on the manager, the principal nonetheless faces an induced incentive problem because the periodic cash flows reflect both investment and managerial effort. Though cash payoffs from current investments are not realized until a later date, the stock market reflects information about these payoffs in the firm's current stock price. In the basic version of our model, the market provides a perfect assessment of future investment returns at each point in time.
3 Thus inclusion of the "forward looking" stock price in the manager's performance measure is one way to generate investment incentives. However, market prices must include all value-relevant components of investment returns, even though some of these are random fluctuations beyond the manager's control. An accrual accounting system, which shields the manager from current investment expenditures by capitalizing them, provides an alternative way to generate investment incentives. A drawback of accrual accounting in our model is that the measurement for investment expenditures is subject to errors. A third way for providing investment incentives is to ignore forward looking market prices and historical, backward looking accounting measures altogether, and rely exclusively on the stream of realized cash flows. The main questions then become: (i) is it essential to rely on all three performance indicators, and (ii) how should 1 See, for instance, Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Jensen and Murphy (1990) , Rappaport (1999) and Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) . 2 Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) provide a summary of the related empirical literature. 3 In contrast, in the one-period models of Paul (1992) , Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) , Kim and Suh (1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000) , the market's valuation of the firm is afflicted by exogenous random disturbances.
these be aggregated in designing optimal performance measures?
Our analysis demonstrates that optimal performance measures must rely on all sources of information, i.e., cash flows, accruals, and stock prices, even under the most ideal contracting conditions: the parties are equally patient, they can make long-term commitments, and the underlying agency problem is stationary.
4 Under those ideal conditions, identical incentive contracts based on the actual periodic cash flows alone would cause the manager to internalize the principal's investment objectives. Nonetheless, such contracts would not be optimal because the manager would be exposed to the entire volatility associated with investment payoffs. For the purpose of performance measurement, stock price is not only essential in providing investment incentives but also for "filtering out" some of the variability in investment returns. This latter contracting role of stock prices can be thought of as a form of intertemporal relative performance evaluation in which current price serves as a benchmark for evaluating the manager's future performance.
The main role of the accounting system in our model is to separate investment expenditures from current operating expenses, but this separation is assumed to involve measurement errors. For example, investment expenditures for product development, personnel training or process improvement can frequently not be traced directly, but instead are measured according to internal allocation rules which rely on select allocation bases. By capitalizing the measured investment expenditures, accounting income shields managers, at least partially, from the negative cash flow effect of current investment expenditures, and thereby provides investment incentives. At the same time, however, the accounting measurement errors introduce risk factors of their own which entail a corresponding agency cost.
The weight on current market price relative to the weight on current income in an optimal performance measure reflects the need to balance two risk factors: measurement error in the identification of investment expenditures and variability of future cash flows reflected in the firm's current market price. To optimize this tradeoff, the principal adopts a conservative asset valuation rule, i.e., a dollar of measured investment expenditures is capitalized at a rate of less than one, even though accounting measurements are unbiased on average. Furthermore, the optimal capitalization rate is decreasing in the amount of accounting measurement error. For potentially large errors, it becomes desirable to adopt a policy of full expensing.
Our initial analysis considers a dividend policy under which the entire current cash flow (net of compensation) is fully paid out to the firm's owners. We then demonstrate that our findings on the relative use of accounting income and market price can be adapted to arbitrary dividend policies. To replace market price by a measure that is invariant to past dividend payments, the principal can resort to market value added, i.e., cum-dividend price less the compounded beginning of the period price. Similarly, residual income (or economic value added) is invariant to current and past dividend payments, yet it preserves the information content of accounting income. We find that a weighted average of market value added and residual income is an optimal performance measure irrespective of the firm's dividend policy.
In fact, a linear combination of these two value added measures becomes essentially the unique optimal performance measure if the compensation schemes are memoryless, i.e., the compensation parameters are not conditioned on past information.
While the basic version of our model gives the market perfect ability to project the firm's future cash flows, we also consider a more realistic scenario in which the market receives imperfect information, i.e., its aggregate signal of future cash flows resulting from current investment is subject to an (unbiased) error term. One might expect that as market information becomes less precise, an optimal performance measure puts less weight on current stock price and instead relies more heavily on accounting measurements and future cash flows. We find, however, that this intuition is generally not correct due to a countervailing effect: with less precise information, the market's valuation of the firm relies less on its own noisy signal and more on the manager's equilibrium investment choice. As a consequence, the sensitivity of the signal provided by current stock price decreases, and this may make it desirable to put a nominally larger weight on stock price. In the earlier one-period models of Paul (1992) , Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) and Kim and Suh (1993) the firm's market price aggregates signals received by the market and the firm's accounting system. Each of these signals reflects the manager's unobservable effort plus some random noise. 5 Ideally, the manager's rewards would be based on the firm's terminal cash flow, yet because this cash flow is assumed to be unavailable for contracting purposes, it becomes essential to rely on both the accounting signal and the stock price. In contrast, our multi-period model with investment choices allows for the possibility that managerial compensation is based exclusively on the stream of delivered cash flows. To do so, however, would unduly constrain the provision of incentives across time periods. Both the forward looking stock price and the backward looking accounting information are valuable performance indicators beyond the actual cash flows.
Aside from earlier studies on accounting data versus stock price in executive compensation schemes, our paper is also related to recent work examining the inclusion of non-financial variables in managerial performance measures. 6 The alleged informational role of these variables is that they are indicative of future cash flows resulting from current or past decisions. The firm's stock price serves a similar function in our model. The essential difference, however, is that stock price is not merely a mechanical indicator of future cash flows, but instead reflects the market's equilibrium assessment of future events given the incentive plan put in place by the firm's owners. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
Section 3, we first examine the need for stock price in addition to actual cash flows in a simplified setting in which accounting measurements are highly imprecise and therefore useless for contracting purposes. Our main results on the optimal aggregation of market and accounting based measures, in particular market value added versus economic value added, are derived in Section 4. Imperfect market information is introduced in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6.
Model Description
We consider a principal-agent relationship which extends over T periods. In each period, the agent (manager) contributes to current operating cash flow through personally costly effort.
In addition, the agent makes investment decisions. These investments require an initial cash outflow in a given period and result in uncertain cash inflows in the next period. 7 For any 1 < t ≤ T , the firm's total cash flow is:
6 See, for example, Dikolli (2001) , Sliwka (2002) and Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) . 7 It would be straightforward to extend our analysis so as to allow for the possibility that investment returns are received over several periods.
Here, a t represents the agent's effort andε t is a random variable which reflects operating noise. The cash investment in period t (which starts at date t−1 and ends at date t) is denoted by b t , with b t ∈ [b, b] . The function m t−1 (b t−1 ) represents the expected gross return from investment undertaken in period t − 1; this expected return function is assumed to be strictly concave such that m ′ t−1 (b t−1 ) → ∞ as b t−1 → b, and m ′ t−1 (b t−1 ) → 1 as b t−1 →b. The actual investment returns are uncertain, as reflected in the noise termμ t−1 , and the amount of risk is assumed to be independent of the scale of investment over the range [b, b] .
The realization ofμ t−1 occurs at the end of period t−1. As a benchmark, we denote the first-best level of investment by b
Initially, all parties are assumed to know at date t the investment return f t ≡ m t (b t ) + µ t to be realized at date t + 1. However, f t is assumed to be non-contractible, and therefore compensation cannot be tied directly to this variable. Our interpretation here is that knowledge of f t reflects the " collective wisdom" of the market and is based on a variety of information sources in the economy, e.g., analysts' reports. In accordance with this interpretation, f t is reflected in the firm's market price at date P t .
The firm's accounting system is assumed to generate a verifiable and contractible signal y t of the current investment expenditure b t . Our model captures the notion that for "softer" investments, like those in product development, process improvement and personnel training, the accounting system is imperfect in its ability to separate investment expenditures from current operating expenditures. Such separation of expenditures is subject to measurement errors when different expenditures are not directly traceable but instead must be derived through some allocation procedure. To capture the notion of accounting measurement error, we assume that the signal y t is equal to the true expenditures plus a random error term. Thus, the accounting system generates the following verifiable measure of investment:
whereη t is a zero-mean normally distributed random variable which reflects measurement errors. An arbitrarily large variance of the random variableη t effectively amounts to a setting in which operating expenditures cannot be separated from investment expenditures.
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The signal y t can be used to record an asset value: A t = k t · y t , where the "capitalization 8 In the analysis of Kanodia, Singh and Spero (2004) , the accounting system also generates an imperfect measure of investment. In the absence of agency considerations, these authors examine the impact of measurement error on the investment decisions of an owner/manager who wishes to maximize the value rate" k t is a design variable for the purpose of performance measurement. Without loss of generality, the representation in (2) presumes that investments are fully depreciated at the end of their useful lives, i.e., after one period.
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It should be noted that, in contrast to the earlier work of Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) , Kim and Suh (1993) and Sloan (1993), we do not assume that the market is intrinsically noisy.
In the basic version of our model the market delivers a noiseless and unbiased valuation of the firm. In doing so, the market price must include all value relevant information including the realization of the noise term µ t . We also note that, in contrast to the above mentioned studies, there is no need for the market to rely on the available accounting information in our settings. Given knowledge of f t , the market does not learn anything from A t about the future benefits of current investments. Furthermore, the firm's market price is unaffected by current cash flow provided this amount is fully paid out in dividends to shareholders. This feature will obviously change for alternative dividend policies, as examined in Section 4.
Figure 1: Events in Period t
To keep our multiperiod agency model analytically tractable, we adopt the so called len framework with linear contracts, exponential utility and normally distributed noise terms. Specifically, the noise termsμ t ,ε t , andη t are assumed to be independent and normally of his firm. Along similar lines, Kanodia and Mukherji (1996) demonstrate the importance of separating investment expenditures from operating expenditures.
9 If one were to extend our model so as to allow for investment returns to be delivered over multiple periods, the choice of depreciation method would be essentially indeterminate in the current framework. The reason is that in our setting the principal knows the profitability of investments, but she cannot verify the actual investment expenditure. In contrast, Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (2000) consider settings in which investments are verifiable and the role of the depreciation schedule is to motivate a better informed manager to accept all positive NPV projects, and only those.
The sequence of events in any given period is depicted in Figure 1 . The principal is risk-neutral and therefore seeks to maximize the present value of future expected cash flows net of compensation payments (which is equivalent to maximizing the cum-dividend price of the firm). The manager is assumed to be risk-averse and his preferences at date t can be described by an additivity separable exponential utility function of the form:
In each period, the agent's current utility is given by consumption of money, φ i , less the cost of effort e i (a i ). This function is assumed to be increasing and convex on a i ∈ [0, a], such that e Consistent with earlier literature on repeated agency models, the agent is assumed to have access to third party banking. Specifically, the agent can borrow and lend in each period at the interest rate r . Access to third party banking for the agent ensures that the choice of incentive scheme does not need to be concerned with smoothing the agent's consumption over time. Furthermore, third party banking in combination with additivity separable exponential utility implies that at any point in time the agent's preferences over alternative incentive schemes are independent of his current wealth. Without loss of generality, we set the agent's initial wealth to zero. Similarly, there is no restriction in assuming that upon leaving the firm, the agent can earn a net-wage of zero, i.e., he can earn a fixed wageŝ t by exerting effortâ t , such thatŝ t − e t (â t ) = 0. The new information variables available for contracting in period t are c t , A t and P t .
The entire information available to both parties at the beginning of period t+1 can therefore be represented as:
As part of the len framework, compensation is restricted to linear schemes:
where π t is the manager's performance measure which can be based on any linear combination of the variables in I t . While the bonus coefficients, β t , are constants, it will facilitate the economic interpretation of some of our results to allow the fixed payments, α t , to depend (linearly) on the past information variables I t−1 . A compensation scheme will be called memoryless if both α t and β t are constants and therefore all memory requirements are embodied in the performance measure π t .
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Given long-term contracts and the agent's access to credit, there is no need for the principal to condition current compensation on past information variables which have no bearing on current or future realizations. In particular, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to performance measure of the form:
where w t , u t , and v t are coefficients to be chosen by the principal in conjunction with the compensation parameters α t and β t . Without loss of generality, the coefficient on cash flow c t has been normalized to one. Similarly, the coefficient on the asset value A t can be set equal to one because the asset valuation rule, i.e., the capitalization rate k t , is chosen endogenously by the principal. In each period, the stock market values the firm at its expected value of future cash flows. Initially, we consider a full-payout dividend policy, i.e., dividends are equal to total cash flow less the managerial compensation payment in each period. The firm's ex-dividend fair market value then becomes:
where γ ≡ (1 + r) −1 denotes the discount factor based on the interest rate r , and I − t denotes the informational variables in I t except for P t . We note from expressions (1)-(3) that the manager's future compensation depends on current market price, which in turn depends on future compensation. In particular, the market anticipates that for every dollar of current market value the manager will be paid v t+1 in the following period. Given linear contracts, however, it is readily verified that the equilibrium price is:
where the constant K t depends on the compensation parameters of future periods and:
with β T +1 = 0.
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With long-term contracts, the risk neutral principal is concerned only with the present value of compensation payments over the contracting horizon, but is indifferent towards the actual timing of payments. The same is true for the agent since he has additivelyseparable cara risk preferences and can borrow and lend at the principal's interest rate.
To characterize the agent's preferences for alternative long-term contracts, we note from equations (3)- (5) that for a dollar increase in f t , managerial compensation increases by β t · u t · λ t in period t and by β t+1 (1 + v t+1 · λ t ) dollars in period t + 1. Therefore the total discounted increase in compensation is given by β t · Γ t with:
We shall refer to Γ t as the effective aggregate weight on the information variable f t .
Similarly, the effective aggregate weight on the signal y t is given by β t · k t · Λ t , where
Lemma 1 For any compensation scheme of the form in (2)- (3) the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected future utility at date t is given by:
12 See the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix for details. 13 All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
In the multiperiod len model, the agent's preferences reduce to a present value of future mean-variance payoffs. For any long-term contract, the risk premium required by the agent is determined by the aggregate weights Γ t and Λ t attached to the information variables f t and A t , while the choice of the individual coefficients u t , k t , v t , and w t remains indeterminate.
Stock Price versus Cash Flows
We begin our analysis with a simplified setting in which the accounting measurement of investments is essentially useless since σ 2 η = ∞. Alternatively, any incentive provisions may be based on gaap which requires expensing the investment in question, possibly because they pertain to intangible assets. As a consequence, accounting income reduces to cash flow in this section.
To explore the need for including current or past stock price information in the manager's performance measure, we will focus on memoryless compensation schemes throughout this section. The question then becomes whether P t must be included in π t or π t+1 , or both. Put differently, we seek to characterize the choice of u t in π t = c t +u t ·P t +v t ·P t−1 and that of v t+1
Given the mean-variance representation of the agent's preferences in Lemma 1 and the absence of accounting signals (implying that k t = 0), the agent's incentive compatibility constraints with respect to his effort and investment choices can be represented by the following first-order conditions:
and
Since the agent's participation constraint will bind at the initial contracting date (i.e., CE 0 = 0), the principal chooses managerial effort and investment levels, {a t , b t }, which maximize:
subject to the incentive compatibility conditions in (8) and (9). The intuition for our results will become particularly transparent if the underlying agency problem is stationary i.e., the functions e t (·) and m t (·) are time invariant.
Proposition 1
The optimal investment b * t is below the first-best level b 0 t . Even for stationary agency problems, optimal performance measures must include stock price, that is
The principal faces an induced incentive problem with regard to investment decisions, even though investments do not impose a personal cost on the manager. Expressions (9) and (10) show that any investment incentives require an increase in the manager's risk premium
The incentive problem with regard to b t reflects that investment and effort decisions can effectively not be separated. In particular, it is impossible to design a performance measure consisting of two components such that one reflects managerial effort and the other investment expenditures and their returns.
To explain the need for stock price in optimal performance measures, suppose the parties contract only on current cash flows. For a stationary agency problem, the principal seeks to induce the same effort choices across time periods, i.e., β * t = β * t+1 for all t. Therefore, the manager internalizes the principal's preferences with regard to investment and chooses b
• . This is reflected in the fact that the aggregate coefficients Γ t in (6) reduces to γ when β * t = β * t+1 and u t = v t+1 = 0. For stationary agency problems, the incentive compatibility condition in (9) simplifies to:
and hence the manager will invest the first-best amount in each period.
The main drawback of a cash flow based performance measure is that the manager is fully exposed to the volatility of the investment returns, i.e., the random disturbancesμ t .
In order to minimize the manager's risk exposure and the attendant expected compensation cost, the principal seeks to induce less than the first-best level of investment. To see this, we note from the principal's objective function in (10) that a slight lowering of the aggregate weight Γ t below γ would lead to a first-order decline in the manager's risk premium, Γ 2 t · σ 2 µ , with only a second-order effect on the net present value of the investment, γ · m(b t ) − b t .
To accomplish this reduction in risk, however, the firm's stock price must be part of the performance measure in every period, that is (u * t , v * t+1 ) = 0. We conclude that in our multiperiod model the firm's stock price plays a dual role: (i) it provides incentives for investment and (ii) it serves as an instrument for "filtering out" −(1 + r), the manager's performance measure in period t + 1 will be entirely shielded from the investment risk µ t . Such "intertemporal" relative performance evaluation is possible provided the market price at date t correctly anticipates the actual return to be received in cash at date t + 1. In fact, the principal could eliminate the manager's exposure to the investment risk, µ t , entirely by setting u t = 0 and v t = −(1+r). Such a choice of coefficients would, however, eliminate all investment incentives, as can be seen from (6).
It is instructive to contrast our finding in Proposition 1 with the earlier single period contracting models of Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) and Kim and Suh (1993) . In these models, the manager's reward would ideally be based on the firm's terminal cash flow. However, this variable is assumed to be unavailable for contracting purpose, and therefore it becomes essential to rely on stock price. In contrast, the firm's cash flows are available for contracting our model. With identical bonus parameters, the manager's aggregate performance measure effectively takes the following form:
The present value T +1 t=1 γ t · c t represents the amount of shareholder value created over the life of the firm, and is therefore the obvious counterpart to the terminal cash flow variable in a single period setting. Proposition 1 shows that optimal contracts cannot be based on
t=1 γ t · c t alone (i.e., one cannot setû t = 0) because the stock price anticipates the actual investment return to be delivered in the next period allowing the principal to remove some of the investment risk from the manager's performance measure.
14 It is also instructive to relate our result in Proposition 1 to the findings of Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) . In their multiperiod agency model, the principal can rely on a leading indicator variable which projects future investment returns subject to measurement error. Contrary to our Proposition 1, Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) find that for stationary agency problems the leading indicator variable should receive zero weight and contracts should be conditioned exclusively on delivered cash flows. In our setting, stock price also serves as a 14 An alternative way to view the need for stock price in our model is to envision a one-period multi-task model in which the agent chooses (a 1 , a 2 , b 1 ). Assuming the principal cares about a weighted average of the two contractible variables c 1 = a 1 + ε 1 − b 1 and c 2 + a 2 + m(b 1 ) + µ + ε 2 , more efficient incentive provisions can be implemented by contracting in addition on the variable f 1 = m 1 (b 1 ) + µ. Inclusion of this variable allows for an effective decomposition of the overall "noise" in c 2 .
leading indicator variable, however, the variability included in this variable is not merely measurement error but instead projects actual cash flow in the subsequent period. As a consequence, P t is incentive relevant even in a stationary environment.
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For non-stationary agency problems one would expect stock price to remain an essential variable. Optimality requires that the performance measure must have minimal variance while satisfying the incentive compatibility conditions. Straightforward but tedious algebra shows that these conditions can "generally" not be satisfied simultaneously if both u t = v t+1 = 0. More precisely, this claim holds true except for "knife-edge" configurations of the underlying parameters.
The full commitment scenario considered so far presumes that the manager can commit to stay with the firm even if he might be better off leaving at some intermediate date. We next consider a scenario in which the principal can credibly make long-term commitments, but the agent cannot. A compensation scheme must therefore satisfy the requirement that at each date the discounted sum of the agent's future utility payoffs is least as large as his market alternative. We show that imposing these additional interim participation constraints affects neither the principal's expected payoff nor the induced effort and investment choices. The sequential rationality requirement imposed by the interim participation constraints implies that rewards (and penalties) can effectively not be deferred to later periods. To see this, we recall that the realization of the noise term µ t is known to all parties at date t. Since µ t has unbounded support, the interim participation constraints can be satisfied only if the performance measures of periods t + 1 and thereafter are independent of µ t . In particular,
must be independent of µ t . Thus, v t+1 = −(1 + r). Substituting this choice of v t+1 into (5), the expression for the market price P t simplifies to:
The interim participation constraints require that the lagged stock price exactly offsets the future cash returns from current investments. As a consequence, the future cash returns do not generate any investment incentives, but instead such incentives must be generated via the current stock price. As a further implication, the principal's problem becomes intertemporally separable, i.e., the effort level and investment amount for period t can be chosen in a myopically optimal fashion. In particular, the risk-neutral principal's objective for period t is to choose (a * t ,b * t ) so as to maximize:
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (8) and (9). A comparison of the above optimization problem with (10) reveals that the principal's contracting problem in (12) is identical to its counterpart in the full-commitment setting subject to the additional constraints that v t+1 = −(1 + r). We recall, however, that for the initial problem with bilateral long-term commitments, the optimal solution to the principal's contracting problem determines only the values of aggregate coefficients Γ t , whereas the individual values of u t and v t remain indeterminate. Imposing the interim participation constraints thus only restricts the degrees of freedom in the design of optimal performance measure.
Corollary to Proposition 1:
(i) The interim participation constraints affect neither the principal's expected payoff nor the induced effort and investment choices.
(ii) With interim participation constraints, the optimal weights on market price, relative to the weight on cash flow, are equal to:
The interim participation constraints force a clean separation of the two contracting roles that the firm's stock price plays in our model. Current stock price is used to generate investment incentives, while lagged stock price eliminates the uncertainty in the investment returns from the agent's performance measure in the subsequent period.
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To conclude this section, we contrast the performance measure derived in the above corollary with the following measure of market value added:
When divided by the beginning of the period stock price, V A t is equal to the stock's abnormal return. This measure represents the value added for shareholders in period t. In particular, the present value of the V A t is equal to the present value of all cash flows. Even though market value added measure captures value creation for shareholders perfectly, the above corollary shows that V A t is not an optimal performance measure: the coefficient on current stock price should be u * t , which is less than one. The V A t metric exposes the manager to excessive levels of risk with regard to the uncertain investment returns. This discrepancy between shareholder value creation and optimal performance measurement arises because the random payoffsμ t are value relevant, but they are beyond the manager's control. If it were the case that σ 2 µ = 0, V A t would be an optimal performance measure since then b * t = b 0 t and therefore u * t = 1. Furthermore, current cash flow would then also be an optimal performance measure provided the underlying agency problem is stationary.
Stock Price versus Accounting Information
We now examine optimal performance measures when the accounting system provides an unbiased though noisy estimate of the amount of investments undertaken in each period. For many types of soft investments, it is frequently difficult for the accounting system to separate investment expenditures from current operating expenses. In our model, the resulting noisy measurements of investments are represented by the signalsỹ t = b t +η t . Following the 16 It is readily verified that in the current setting of perfect market information long-term commitments by the principal are not essential, i.e., long-and short-term contracts perform equally well. With imperfect market information, however, long-term contracts perform better than short-term contracts because the latter entail additional frictions; see, Christensen, Feltham and Sabac (2003) and Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) .
17 Our definition of market value added differs from that in the Value Based Management literature, where market value added is frequently defined as stock price minus "capital invested" (i.e., book value); see, for instance, Young and O'Byrne (2000) .
arguments in the previous section, it can be shown that imposing interim participation constraints changes neither the optimal decisions nor the principal's expected payoff. We thus impose these constraints throughout the remainder of the analysis.
To facilitate the interpretation of optimal performance measures with imperfect accounting information, it will be convenient to express the performance measure as a linear combination of accounting income as well as current and lagged stock price:
where income I t ≡ c t + A t − A t−1 and asset value A t at date t is equal to the capitalized current investment k·y t .
18 Since the lagged asset value A t−1 is commonly known at date t−1
and has unbounded support, the interim participation constraints require that the agent's compensation in period t and thereafter must be independent of A t−1 . Since accounting income sets the coefficient on A t−1 equal to one, a performance measure of the form in (15) can satisfy the interim participation constraints only if the fixed payments α t are allowed to be (linear) functions of A t−1 .
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The interim participation constraints also require that the performance measures of period t and thereafter must be independent of µ t−1 . As before, this requirement can be satisfied by setting v t+1 = −(1 + r). As a consequence, the firm's market price P t in (5) again simplifies to: P t = γ · f t + K t . Furthermore, the aggregate weight Γ t on the market signal reduces to γ · u t , while the aggregate weight Λ t on the accounting signal reduces to k t . The principal thus seeks (a * t , b * t ) which maximize:
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints:
18 As mentioned in Section 2, A t is not affected by past investment expenditures because investments have a useful life of one period and are depreciated fully in the period following their capitalization.
19 In Proposition 3 below, we derive optimal memoryless compensation schemes for which α t and β t are independent of the history. (18) show that the two incentive problems become separable in the presence of the interim participation constraints. Effort incentives are driven entirely by the bonus coefficients β t . These coefficients, in turn, have no bearing on the manager's investment decisions which are determined entirely by the coefficients u t and k t inside the performance measure.
Expressions (16)-
Proposition 2 The weight on current market price, relative to the weight on income, in an optimal performance is equal to:
with the optimal capitalization rate k * t given by:
The optimal investment, b * t is again below the first-best level, though the investment b * t identified in Proposition 2 is larger than that in Proposition 1 because the incentive constraint in (18) is easier to satisfy in the presence of the accounting signal. For given b * t , the principal chooses the weights on the current market price, u * t , and the optimal capitalization rate, k * t , to minimize the overall variance in the manager's performance measure subject to the two interacting incentive compatibility constraints. We note that the choice of optimal coefficients u * t and k * t is independent of the underlying moral hazard problem, except through b * t which is affected by the choice of bonus coefficients.
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For "hard" investments, like those in property, plant, and equipment, one would expect only negligible measurement errors by the accounting system. Proposition 2 shows that it is then optimal to shield the manager from the investment cost by fully capitalizing the measured investment expenditure, i.e., by setting k t equal to one. As a consequence, current stock price is no longer needed to generate investment incentives, though lagged stock price is still required in the following period to filter out the noise in the investment returns.
When the separation between operating and investment expenditures is subject to measurement errors, reliance on the accounting signal entails a new source of risk for the agent.
20 At first glance it may seem surprising that the noisy accounting signal receives a positive weight even for stationary agency problems. The argument here is essentially the one given in connection with the Corollary to Proposition 1: the signal A t cannot be ignored in order to induce b * t with a risk minimizing performance measure.
The expression for the optimal k * t in (20) reveals that accounting measurement errors calls for conservative capitalization in the sense that 0 < k * t < 1. Thus, the observed amount y t is neither fully capitalized nor fully expensed. The intuition for this result is that with full capitalization the manager would be completely shielded from the investment expenditure, and hence there would be no further need to include current stock price in the performance measure. Yet, the principal could create identical investment incentives more cheaply by putting a small weight on current stock price. This follows from the fact that the objective function in (16) is quadratic in u * t , and hence the resulting amount of risk is negligible for small values of u * t . The result in Proposition 1 can be used to address the following question. If the nature of the investment is such that gaap accounting calls for direct expensing, what would be the resulting economic loss, if the firm also were to follow an accounting policy of direct expensing for the purpose of performance evaluation?
21 The above result shows that if the principal were to restrict himself to gaap accounting income (which would be equal to cash flow) and stock price as performance indicators, there would be more severe underinvestment, i.e., the principal would induce a level of investment below b * t . In addition, the manager would be exposed to unnecessary risk, and the principal would have to bear the attendant cost of a higher risk premium.
The preceding discussion suggests that ceteris paribus less weight should be placed on stock price if investment returns entail higher volatility. Conversely, one would expect less reliance on accounting income, in particular the noisy asset measures, as investments become "softer". Equations (19) and (20) show that, for a given investment level b * t , the optimal capitalization rate indeed increases monotonically in σ 2 µ and decreases monotonically in σ 2 η . This reasoning is incomplete, however, since both the optimal a * t and b * t are also functions of the respective noise terms. To simplify the following comparative statics result, we focus on a setting in which the bonus parameter β t exogenously fixed at some 0 < β * t < 1.
22
21 The literature on accounting for intangibles has frequently suggested that there may be substantial economic costs associated with a policy of expensing investments in intangible assets; see, for example, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) . In a pure valuation context, these costs appear to be more difficult to capture than in the current management control setting.
22 This specification may reflect that the marginal cost of effort e ′ t (a t ) is equal to β * t for a t ≤ a * t , while this marginal cost is prohibitively large for a t ≥ a * t .
Corollary to Proposition 2: For fixed bonus parameters β * t :
(i) the optimal weight on the market price, u * t , is decreasing in σ 2 µ .
(ii) the optimal capitalization rate, k * t , is decreasing in σ 2 η .
A well known result from single-period agency theory is that for the purpose of optimal performance measurement multiple signals should be aggregated according to their signalto-noise-ratio, i.e., the relative weight on a signal should be given by its sensitivity times its precision.
23 In our context, the signals P t and y t are included in the manager's performance measure to provide investment incentives rather than effort incentives. Specifically, the sensitivity of the signal P t is given by:
while the sensitivity of the signal y t is given by:
η and the precision of a signal is defined to be the inverse of its variance, we find that the relative weight on each signal is indeed proportional to its sensitivity times its precision:
The finding that stock price and the noisy asset measure will be aggregated in proportion to their signal-to-noise ratio reflects the force of the interim participation constraints in our multiperiod model. As argued above, these constraints essentially make the principal's problem intertemporally separable and therefore the results obtained in static agency models continue to apply. We note, however, that this conclusion does rely on the market's ability to perfectly anticipate future investment returns. Section 5 below that intertemporal separation 23 Banker and Datar (1989) have established this result for a select class of agency problems. Feltham and Xie (1994) provide further characterizations of the optimal weights to be placed on alternative signals in the context of a multi-task LEN-model will no longer obtain once the market's anticipation of future investment payoffs is also subject to measurement errors.
In our analysis so far the firm's stock price has effectively been a "flow" rather than a "stock" variable due to the assumption that the periodic cash flows are paid out to shareholders. We now allow for the possibility that cash flows are partly or fully retained in the business and shareholders receive periodic dividend payments. The literature on equity valuation has long argued that expected future dividends are not an operational criterion for valuing a firm since dividend payments reflect value distribution rather than value creation. Consistent with this view, Ohlson (1999) shows in a multiperiod agency model (in which there is no external capital market) that optimal contracts do not need to depend on dividend payments. Our multiperiod len framework allows us to draw the sharper conclusion that optimal performance measures must be invariant to the firm's dividend policy. Let d t denote the amount of dividend paid in period t and C t denote the firm's cash balance at the end of period t. This balance is invested at the interest rate r , and therefore satisfies the relation:
where the cash flow c t is given by (1). The firm's book value then becomes BV t = C t + A t , and comprehensive income measurement requires that:
Accounting income therefore is the sum of operating income and financing (or interest)
income. As before, the market does not obtain new information from the accruals, i.e, the variable A t in our setting. However, when cash flow are no longer paid out as dividends, the firm's market price reflects the firm's cash balance in addition to expected future cash flows. Specifically, the firm's market price is now given by:
where K t again is a constant determined by the parameters of the agent's compensation scheme in future periods. We restrict attention to linear dividend policies of the form:
for some linear function L t (I t−1 ) and arbitrary coefficients θ 1 and θ 2 . This class of dividend policies includes commonly used dividend arrangements such as fixed payout ratios based on current accounting income.
Irrespective of the actual dividend policy, an optimal performance measure must still provide a linear aggregation of the information variables c t , y t and k t such that:
with u * t and k * t as given in Proposition 2. Such performance measures can, however, no longer be written as linear combinations of accounting income and stock price since both of these component measures are sensitive to the firm's dividend policy. Intuitively, the principal seeks two component measures, one of which represents the signal f t available to the market, the other represents the accounting signal y t and both component measures are invariant to the actual dividend policy.
The market-value-added measure introduced in Section 3 is indeed invariant to the actual dividend policy. Specifically, in our setting the cum-dividend price less the compounded beginning of the period price becomes:
As argued in Section 3, V A t is not an optimal performance measure because it puts too much weight on stock price relative to cash flow. In addition, market value added does not capture the accounting information A t because for valuation purposes the market does not need to pay attention to the accruals in our setting. To construct a value added measure based on accounting information, we note that while current accounting income is not affected by current dividends, it does depend on past dividends through the interest income r · C t . Residual income, however, is independent of both current and past dividend payments.
Specifically:
One drawback of residual income is that it depends on f t−1 and A t−1 , which conflicts with the interim participation constraints, at least for memoryless compensation schemes. Accordingly, we consider the following measure of "calibrated" residual income, defined as residual income less the compounded difference between beginning of the period market and book value. Straightforward algebra shows that:
The following result shows that a properly weighted average of economic value added, i.e., calibrated residual income, and market value added indeed constitutes an optimal performance measure for any dividend policy. Furthermore, this weighted average measure becomes essentially unique if one insists on memoryless compensation schemes. To state the claim formally, two performance measures will be called equivalent if one is obtained from the other through an affine transformation, i.e., through the addition and multiplication of constants. Obviously, any claim about uniqueness can only apply to the entire class of equivalent measures.
Proposition 3 Suppose {s
is an optimal memoryless compensation scheme for some dividend policy of the from in (21). Then π t is equivalent to:
with the capitalization rate, k * * t , given by k * *
, and k * t and u * t as given in Proposition 2 Consistent with our earlier findings, the optimal π * t puts its entire weight on the accounting component, RI t , if there is no accounting measurement error. In that case, k * t = k * * t = 1 and u * t = 0. Conversely, without uncertainty in the future investment returns, we find that k * t = k * * t = 0 and furthermore u * t = 1, since in this extreme case b *
For intermediate values of k * t and u * t , the resulting capitalization rate k * * t will again between zero and one, thus preserving our earlier finding of conservative accounting.
Proposition 3 takes the firm's dividend policy as arbitrary but fixed. The uniqueness of π * t derives from the fact that with memoryless compensation schemes an optimal performance must satisfy (22). We also note that the uniqueness of π * t does not imply that the coefficient on current dividends must be zero in an optimal performance measure. It would be possible, for example, to have current dividends proportional to current cash flow and to assign a positive coefficient to dividends. To preserve optimality, however, the other coefficients would then have to be aligned so that the resulting performance measure is equivalent to the convex combination of V A t and RI c t given in (24). Our finding in Proposition 3 is consistent with the empirical results in Bushman et al. (2004) showing that firms place greater value on equity based incentives as accrual accounting information becomes less reliable. Conversely, we predict that greater volatility in the firm's investment payoffs will ceteris paribus result in greater weight being placed on the accounting measure, with the exact weights given by k * * t and u * t . Finally, it is instructive to recall the suggestion by Paul (1992) that a possible advantage of accounting income over stock price is that income is a value added measure, while market price is a stock variable. Our multiperiod model highlights the fact that V A t is an effective value added measure. Yet, optimality requires that this value added measure based on forward looking market information must be combined with a measure based on backward looking accounting information.
Imperfect Market Information
In the preceding sections, the market was presumed to have perfect foresight about the future payoffs resulting from current investments. This section examines the more realistic scenario in which the market's aggregate information about investment returns is imperfect.
For notational simplicity, we first focus on a setting in which the firm's net cash flow is paid out as dividend in each period. To model a market with imperfect information, we represent its information by the realization of a noisy signal about the future cash flows. In particular, the market is assumed to observe the realization of the random variable:
whereδ t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 δ . Unlike the perfect market setting in Section 3 and 4, the market no longer directly observes the returns from investments, m t (b t ) + µ t . The magnitude of the variance σ 2 δ represents the market's residual uncertainty about the future investment returns.
In forming expectations regarding next period's cash flows, the market must rely on not only on its signal f t but also on its conjecture about the agent's investment choice in the current period. In fact, since the noise term,δ t , by itself is not value relevant, the market pays attention to f t only because it is informative about the realization of µ t . Letb t denote the market's conjecture about the agent's investment choice in period t. The market rationally anticipates the agent's investment choice, and thereforeb t = b * t , in equilibrium. As before, the market's valuation of the firm is not affected by the asset value A t . Sinceμ t andδ t are normally distributed, the conditional expectation for the future cash inflow is:
where
Expression (26) shows that the market's expectation for the future cash flows is a weighted average of its noisy signal f t and its conjecture about the expected investment payoffs m t (b t ).
The market puts more weight on its signal as this signal becomes more precise, i.e., h increases in the precision of the market information,
Given (26) and a contract of the form in (2)-(3), the firm's market value at date t becomes:
where the constant K t depends on the compensation parameters of future periods, and λ t and ω t are identical to the ones derived in connection with expression (4). To extend Lemma 1 to the imperfect market setting, we note that the interim participation constraints again require that the manager's expected compensation be independent of f t and y t in period t + 1 and thereafter. This again implies that the coefficients on the lagged variables P t−1 and A t−1 to be zero. The firm's market value at date t thus simplifies to:
Lemma 2: If a compensation scheme of the form in (2)-(3) satisfies the interim participation constraints, then the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected utility at date t becomes:
As before, the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected utility in (29) takes a meanvariance form. 24 Direct comparison shows that the variance term in (29) differs from the corresponding expression in the perfect market setting in two respects. First, the variance term contains an additional component, namely (1−h)·σ 2 µ , which reflects the agent's residual uncertainty regarding the payoffs in the current period from the investment made in the previous period.
25 Second, the variance of the current market price differs from the one in the perfect market setting. With noisy market information,V ar[
µ . From the certainty equivalent expression in (29), it follows that the manager will make his investment choice so as to maximize E[s t + γ ·s t+1 |I t−1 ]. Given the expression in (28) and collecting the relevant terms yields the following necessary condition for an interior level of investment, b t :
The principal again seeks to maximize the stream of future expected cash flows less the cost of effort and the attendant risk premium:
subject to the investment incentive compatibility constraint in (30) and the effort incentive compatibility condition β * t = e ′ t (a t ). In solving the above optimization problem, the principal chooses the induced level of effort a t , the induced level of investment b t , the weight on the market price u t , and the capitalization rate k t . We note that the principal's optimization problem is no longer intertemporally separable since the incentive compatibility condition in (30) involves β t+1 , the bonus parameter in the subsequent period.
24 The arguments underlying Lemma 2 are almost identical to those used in proving Lemma 1, and we therefore omit the proof. We note, though, that when the market had perfect information, it did not matter that the manager was not paid at date T +1, since f t perfectly anticipated the future return. This argument no longer applies with imperfect market information, and it will therefore be convenient to suppose that there is no investment decision in the last period. Thus, b T = 0 and, as a consequence, P T = 0. Alternatively, one could extend the model by allowing for compensation payments at date T + 1.
25 This follows from observing that V ar
Proposition 4: With imperfect market information, the weight on the market price, relative to the weight on income, in an optimal performance is equal to:
The expressions for the optimal weight on current stock price and the optimal capitalization rate are essentially the same as in the perfect market setting, except for the common scaling factor z t < 1 . To provide intuition for our finding in Proposition 4, we recall that in the perfect market setting it was optimal to generate the investment incentives exclusively through income and current stock price. With interim participation constraints, the future cash returns from current investment had no incentive effect because they were neutralized by the inclusion of lagged stock price. This "clean" separation of tasks no longer applies when the market receives an imperfect signal of future cash flows. With imperfect market information, it is no longer possible to shield the manager entirely from the investment payoffs, m t−1 (b t−1 ) + µ t−1 , in period t. 26 One consequence of this less precise intertemporal relative performance evaluation is that the rewards tied to future cash flow generate some investment incentives. Specifically, we recall from expression (28) that the market price is a weighted average of its signal f t , which depends on the manager's actual investment choice, and m t (b t ), which depends on the market's conjectureb t of the manager's investment choice. From the manager's viewpoint, the expected contribution to
26 If the market's noisy signal f t−1 = m t−1 (b t−1 ) + µ t−1 + δ t−1 were directly available for contracting purposes, the manager's risk exposure would be minimized by putting weight −h ≡ − = −h . Since the market discounts its signal f t−1 precisely by the factor h in pricing the firm, the optimal weight on the lagged stock price remains unchanged from that in the perfect market setting, i.e., −(1 + r). Thus, the lagged stock price must receive the same weight as required to satisfy the manager's interim participation constraint, i.e., the current performance measure must be invariant to f t−1 .
his performance measure in the next period equals
Since the manager treats the market's conjectureb t as fixed, his investment choice b t increases next period's compensation at the rate of β *
To induce b * t , the principal can thus correspondingly reduce the weights on current stock price and the accounting signal.
27
Proposition 4 shows that the variance term σ 2 δ , which captures the degree of market imperfection, affects the optimal choice of coefficients u * t and k * t directly as well as indirectly via the induced action and investment choices. In order to focus on the direct effect, we consider a specialized setting in which the optimal action and investment choices are invariant to the parameters of the underlying agency problems. For instance, these choices may not be interior but always the maximal values, i.e., a t =ā and b t =b. The proof of the following result (in the Appendix) provides sufficient conditions for these boundary values to be optimal. For notational convenience, we define e Proposition 4': Suppose it is optimal to induce a t =ā and b t =b in each period. Then the weight on market price, relative to the weight on income, in an optimal performance is equal to:
With the desired effort and investment levels held fixed, it may be optimal to set both u * t and k * t equal to zero. In contrast, Proposition 2 established that an optimal performance measure always puts positive weights on both the accounting information and the market price. The reason for this difference is that with imperfect market information an optimal performance measure effectively returns (1 − h) · m t−1 (b t−1 ) in period t for the investment 27 Comparison of the objective functions in (16) and (31) immediately reveals that the optimal b * t in the perfect market setting generally differs from the optimal b * t in the imperfect market setting. expenditure b t−1 made in period t−1. Consequently, if the market information is sufficiently imprecise (i.e., (1 − h) is sufficiently large) and the bonus parameters across two consecutive periods are properly aligned, it will not be necessary to rely on current stock price or accounting information to induce the optimal investment decision.
Corollary to Proposition 4'
(i) The optimal weight on the market price, u * t , is decreasing (increasing) in the precision of the market information, if (ii) Relative to the optimal weight on the market price, the optimal capitalization rate, k * t , remains constant in the precision of the market information.
It may appear counterintuitive at first that as market information becomes less precise, the principal wants to rely more, rather than less, on market price. It must be kept in mind, though, that lower precision of the market's information has two opposing effects on the optimal coefficient u * t . First, the market relies more on its equilibrium beliefs about the agent's investment choice and less on its information about the actual investment choice, as market information becomes less precise. As a consequence, stock price becomes a less powerful instrument for inducing investment incentives, and therefore the principal needs to increase u * t in order to induce a given investment choice. Secondly, however, next period's performance measure becomes a more powerful incentive device as the market information becomes less precise. This effect will tend to lower the principal's reliance on the current market price in providing investment incentives. The expression for z t shows that the magnitude of this second effect depends on the relative magnitudes of the bonus coefficients in periods t and t + 1. When
is relatively small, the first effect dominates in the sense that u * t increases as the market information becomes less precise. On the other hand, when
is relatively large, the second effect dominates, and the optimal weight on the market price decreases as the precision of the market information declines.
The result that the ratio
δ also may appears counterintuitive at first sight. One might have expected that the principal would rely more on the accounting information as market price becomes a less precise indicator of future cash flows. We recall, however, that the investment incentive is determined by the effective weight on the market signal f t , i.e., u * t · h · γ , rather than by the nominal weight on the market price, i.e., u * t . While the ratio k * t u * t remains constant, the ratio of the effective weights
increases as the market information becomes less precise. Put differently, the sensitivity of the market price, as given by γ · h · m ′ t , declines as the market information becomes less precise. At the same time, however, the precision of the market price, as given by (γ 2 · σ 2 µ · h) −1 , improves because the market relies less on its own signal in pricing the firm. These two effects offset each other exactly, and the relative weights on the two signals remain unchanged.
Throughout the preceding analysis investment related cash inflows were assumed to be uncertain, i.e. σ 2 µ > 0. In the limit case of a deterministic return relationship (i.e., σ 2 µ = 0), the market can perfectly predict the agent's "equilibrium" investment choice without relying on its noisy signal f t = m t (b t ) + δ t . Consequently, the market signal becomes irrelevant for valuation purposes even though it is incrementally informative about the agent's investment choice.
28 Since the firm's market price only depends on the agent's conjectured but not his actual investment choice, market price becomes useless for incentive purposes and therefore the optimal weight u * t will be indeterminate. However, with some uncertainty, no matter how small, in the investment return relationship, the market signal becomes useful for forecasting future cash flows and the optimal u * t is determined uniquely as given in Proposition 4'. In concluding this section, we note that our main results in Section 4 on alternative dividend policies remains essentially unchanged when the market's signal of future investment returns, f t , is subject to random disturbances. The coefficients u * t and k * t in Proposition 3 must then be chosen as in Proposition 4. As a consequence, it can no longer be guaranteed that the coefficients u * t , k * t and k * * t are between zero and one.
Conclusion
In a multiperiod agency setting we have examined the role of stock price and accounting information in managerial performance measures. From an incentive perspective, stock price and accounting data provide fundamentally different types of information. While stock price is forward-looking, accounting information is historical or backward looking. The drawback of stock price as a performance indicator is that it must reflect all value relevant factors even if some of those factors are beyond the manager's control. If investment expenditures, as measured by the accounting system, are properly capitalized, accounting income also generates desirable investment incentives since the manager's current performance measure is shielded from investments by 'deferring' the associated expenditures to future periods.
To the extent that the separation of investment and operating expenditures is subject to measurement errors, however, accounting income is also an imperfect indicator.
Our analysis establishes that in addition to actual cash flows an optimal performance measure must rely on both accounting information and stock price. The familiar performance metrics of market value added and economic value added (residual income) are useful for calibrating stock price and accounting income to the relevant history, in particular to the firm's dividend policy. Our results yield predictions about the relative weights to be placed on these two component measures depending on the accounting measurement errors and the variability in the firm's investment payoffs.
Some of our comparative statics results on the relative use of market-versus accounting information may appear counterintuitive at first. In particular, the relative weight on stock price may increase as the market receives less precise information about the firm's future cash flows. Furthermore, our analysis shows that when the market's information becomes less imprecise, the principal will not necessarily rely more on accounting information. These findings may prove useful in future empirical work which seeks to link the use of stock price in managerial compensation schemes to the characteristics of different investments, firms and industries.
Our analysis suggests several promising directions for future research. First, it would be desirable to expand the model so as to allow managers to have better information about investment projects than owners. In such a setting the market is then also likely to have better information about the future profitability of the firm's investments than the owners.
As a consequence, stock price can assume an additional stewardship role which is to bridge the information asymmetry between owners and management. Secondly, our analysis has focused on managerial decisions while taking the information reported by the accounting system as given. It would seem natural to extend our line of inquiry by allowing managers some control over the accounting reports. This would naturally introduce notions of "earn-ings management" into our multiperiod framework.
29 Finally, the analysis in this paper has focused on a single manager. Many firms seem to use stock price as a firm-wide performance metric and combine it at the divisional level with divisional accounting metrics. Such compensation practices appear to balance complex tradeoffs between long-term performance incentives, coordination across divisions and risk sharing. The theoretical foundation of such practices does not seem to have been examined in sufficient detail, particularly for dynamic incentive problems.
30
29 There are multiple ways of introducing "earnings management" into our contracting model, possibly along the lines of Ewert and Wagenhofer (2004) or Dye and Sridhar (2004) .
30 See Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1995) and Anctil and Dutta (1999) for some analysis on the use of corporate versus divisional performance measures.
with the certainty equivalent CE t determined by:
For details the reader is referred to Dutta and Reichelstein (1999, Lemma 1) . The claim then follows immediately by induction after noting that:
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1: As argued in the text, the interim participation constraint require that v t+1 = −(1 + r). As a consequence, the expression for aggregate weight on the market signal simplifies to γ · u t and (13) follows from the agent's incentive compatibility condition in (9). To complete the proof, it remains to show that for any choice of (β 1 , ...β T )and (u 1 , ...u T ) the principal can choose the fixed payments (α 1 , ...α T ) so as to satisfy the interim participation constraints at date t, i.e., CE t ≥ 0.
Direct substitution show that
whereâ T (β T ) is the effort level induced by β T , i.e. β T ≡ e ′ T (â T (β T )). Therefore:
For any β T the principal can thus choose α T so that the agent's participation constraint in period T is satisfied with equality. For period T − 1, the beginning of the period price is given by:
where K ′ T −1 is a constant depending on β T −1 , u T −1 , α T and β T . Thus,
We conclude that for any β T −1 , u T −1 , β T and α T , the principal can choose α T −1 to satisfy the agent's participation constraint with equality in period T − 1. Proceeding inductively, it follows that the fixed payments α t can be chosen so as to satisfy the participation constraint in each period with equality. 
